#### At what stage is **UNC Modification** this document in the process? UNC 0860: 01 Modification 02 Workgroup Report Clarify impact of exit capacity **Draft Modification** 03 Report holdings on offtake rights Final Modification 04 Report

### **Purpose of Modification:**

To remove redundant text that implies that Users, who do not hold Exit Capacity, might have increased risk of not being able to offtake gas in the short term, and add text that clarifies the rights of Users to offtake gas from the System.

## **Next Steps:**

The Proposer recommends that this Modification should be:

- subject to Self-Governance
- assessed by a Workgroup

This Modification will be presented by the Proposer to the Panel on 19 October 2023. The Panel will consider the Proposer's recommendation and determine the appropriate route.

#### **Impacted Parties:**

High: Shippers

Low: Gas Transporters, Distribution Network Operators

#### **Impacted Codes:**

None

Contents	<b>?</b> Any	
	questions?	
1 Summary	3 Contact: Joint Office	of Ga
2 Governance	4 Transporters	
3 Why Change?	4	
4 Code Specific Matters	6 enquiries@g	
5 Solution	6 rnance.co.ul	<u>K</u>
6 Impacts & Other Considerations	6 0121 28	8 210
7 Relevant Objectives	<u>8</u> 7 Proposer:	
8 Implementation	8 Lauren Jaus RWE Supply	
9 Legal Text	8 Trading Gml	
10 Recommendations	8	
	lauren.jauss om	<u>@rwe</u>
Timetable	07825 9	9549
Modification timetable:	Transporter:  David Mitche	ell
Pre-Modification Discussed	July 2023	
Date Modification Raised	05 October 2023	
New Modification to be considered by Panel	19 October 2023 david.mitche	ell@s
First Workgroup Meeting	02 November 2023	
	15 February 202320	
Workgroup Report to be presented to Panel	June 2024	vidor:
Workgroup Report to be presented to Panel  Draft Modification Report issued for consultation	June 2024  Systems Prov Xoserve  June 2024	vider:
	June 2024  Systems Prov Xoserve	
Draft Modification Report issued for consultation	June 2024  15 February 202321  June 2024  07 March 202311 July	

## 1 Summary

#### What

UNC TPD Section J – Exit Requirements - includes clauses specifying that Transporters are not "obligated to make gas available" to Users at Exit Points or Supply Points if they do not hold Registered Exit Capacity, or if 1/24<sup>th</sup> of that Registered Exit Capacity does not adequately cover the User's hourly gas offtake profile.

- This text implies that Transporters might be permitted to: differentiate between Users based on their Registered Exit Capacity holdings when planning gas deliveries to Exit Points in the short term; or
- reject Offtake Profile Notices (OPNs) on the basis of a User's Registered Exit Capacity holdings; or
- instruct any Users to reduce or discontinue offtake of gas before a Stage 2 Network Gas Supply Emergency (NGSE)

The above points were discussed at an Exit Constraints webinar held by National Gas on 16 December 2022, and clarified in a Q&A Document, subsequently written and published by National Gas.

The Q&A Document says "OPNs are not considered in relation to capacity entitlements as both may change during a Gas Day" and "We can only legally direct a CCGT to cease taking gas when a Stage 2 NGSE is in force. Other forms of disconnection would be market or contract based."

The proposer believes that the obligations of Transporters to "make gas available" need to be clarified in UNC TPD Section J, so it is clear to Users what rights their Exit Capacity holdings convey, and therefore inform their capacity procurement strategy.

The points above were also discussed and are recorded in the <u>Transmission Workgroup minutes from 01 June 2023</u>, where a workgroup participant "noted that there appear to be large sections of text in the Code that are superfluous."

#### Why

Users may be over-buying gas Exit Capacity in <a href="long-term">long-term</a> auctions because they think it might reduce their risk of not being able to offtake gas in the short term. Users\_will be prepared to pay for an increasing amount of capacity, with decreasing probability of their customers flowing against it, if they think the cost of the risk of not having access to gas outweighs the cost of capacity. This risk and hence capacity cost might be borne by Shippers and passed through to customers in overall contract pricing or could be borne directly by some customers depending on contractual arrangements. Meanwhile, this increased Exit Capacity procurement contributes to an increased probability of over-recovery of allowed revenue. It is difficult to forecast this over-buying when setting Forecasting Contracted Capacity and calculating capacity Reserve Prices. If it is not anticipated, the increase in Exit Capacity costs for some Users will not translate into reduced Reserve Prices and hence reduced costs for all other Users DuringUsers during the same Gas Year.

#### How

It is proposed that text in UNC TPD Section J — Exit Requirements, that apparently relieves Transporters from making gas available if a User does not hold Registered Exit Capacity, is removed. This will not make Transporters liable to pay a User who does not hold Exit Capacity compensation. This is because the compensation that would be due would remain as a multiple of a User's Exit Capacity holdings, so if a User does not hold the relevant Exit Capacity, they would still not be eligible for compensation anyway.

## **Joint Office** of Gas Transporters

It is also proposed that the legal text should be added to in UNC TPD Section J should be amended to clarify that a site that submits an Offtake Profile Notice (OPN) would not have this rejected for the reason of not holding the corresponding Exit Capacity.

It is further proposed that text be added to TPD Section Q – Emergencies – to clarify that the reduction or discontinuance of the offtake of gas at Exit Points may only be instructed in accordance with the provisions of that section of the UNC, and for the avoidance of doubt, is unaffected by whether a User holds the relevant Exit Capacity or not.

#### 2 Governance

## **Justification for Self-Governance**

The proposer believes this Modification proposal should clarify current arrangements and have no impact on intended UNC party's rights, obligations or liabilities.

Removal of the initial condition to hold Exit Capacity in order for the Transporter to be obligated to make gas available will not change compensation and therefore commercial arrangements, and the proposer also believes it will not change operational arrangements or outcomes. National Gas clarified in their Exit Constraints webinar and associated Q&A documentation that they cannot instruct certain Users to reduce or discontinue offtake of gas before a Stage 2 Network Gas Supply Emergency and do not reject Offtake Profile Notices (OPNs) on the basis of a User's Registered Capacity holdings, and the intention of this Modification is to bring those clarifications into the UNC.

When discussing these proposed amendments at Transmission Workgroup on 01 June 2023, a workgroup participant "asked for it to be recorded in the minutes that if someone wishes to raise a Modification to remove redundant text, which would likely be a Self-Governance Modification but would require lots of scrutiny so it does not unpick anything else in Code, they can do so." (as recorded in section 1.3 of the minutes).

#### **Requested Next Steps**

This Modification should:

- be considered a non-material change and subject to Self-Governance.
- be assessed by a Workgroup.

# 3 Why Change?

# Current legal text implies that Users without capacity have increased risk of not being able to offtake gas from the system in the short term

The proposer believes that Transporters cannot, and do not, take different within day operational decisions to manage the system depending on a User's Registered Capacity holding. This is because:

- Condition 4F of the Gas Transporter licence says "The licensee must offer access to its system in line
  with the Act and the Directive. Where access to the system is refused duly substantiated reasons shall
  be given".
- A User's principal right to use the Total System is set out in UNC TPD B1.1.1.
- Circumstances where the Transporter has the right to instruct a User to reduce or discontinue offtake of gas (for Example in a Stage 2 Gas Emergency) are specifically defined in the UNC. The proposer is not

aware of any specific circumstances where the Transporter can take actions that impact a User's ability to offtake of gas just because they do not hold Registered Exit Capacity.

- In a webinar held on 16 December 2022, and associated Q&A documentation released on 02 February 2023, National Gas confirmed that they can "only legally direct a CCGT to cease taking gas when a Stage 2 NGSE in force" and that "a site that submits an Offtake Profile Notice would not have this rejected for the reason of not holding the corresponding capacity. OPNs are not considered in relation to capacity entitlements as both may change during a Gas Day".
- The new <u>National Emergency Plan for downstream gas and electricity</u> released July 2023 reinforced the
  rule that demand reduction for GB customers as a result of a Gas Emergency does not occur before
  Stage 2 or higher (at which time Transporters are relieved of all obligations to make gas available,
  regardless of whether a User holds Exit Capacity or not).

The proposer also believes that all capacity is an end of day product and is not influenced by an Offtake Profile. In a "Rules On" situation (UNC TPD C1.8), Users are required to follow their OPN, but there is no obligation to offtake in a 1/24th manner based on Exit Capacity holdings.

Under current arrangements, compensation is calculated as a multiple of the User's Registered Exit Capacity holding in respect of the gas that was not made available, so if no Exit Capacity is held, then no compensation is due. The clauses that essentially specify that Transporters must hold Exit Capacity to be eligible for compensation in the first place are therefore superfluous.

## Unnecessary increased costs are incurred

Clarity of the rights and obligations that holding Registered Exit Capacity conveys is essential in a User's decision as to when and how much Exit capacity to buy for their customers' offtake requirements. A key risk for Users and customers is whether they will be able to access Exit Capacity in short term auctions. This risk even exists at dedicated User Exit Points which have plenty of obligated capacity, because National Gas currently has the right, in certain circumstances, to restrict the quantity of daily firm NTS Capacity made available.

If a User or customer believes there is a risk that they may not be able to access Exit Capacity in short term auctions, and that holding capacity might reduce their risk of not being able to offtake gas from the system, then the User or customer is incentivised to buy more Exit Capacity in long term auctions. Customers with uncertain future offtake are more likely to require their Shipper buy Exit Capacity that covers all their possible offtake, even if they consider that flowing against all that capacity is very unlikely.

The proposer believes that the current charging arrangements are designed with the intent and expectation that Users pay for their flow on the system, and that they will not tend to significantly over-buy Exit Capacity. Ofgem's decision to implement UNC678A was based on modelling results provided by CEPA, which included assumptions that market participants would be able to profile capacity bookings close to actual flows using short-term capacity products (e.g. daily and within day capacity products), thus minimising the costs associated with over-booking of capacity.

The proposer believes that encouraging Users and customers to decide to buy more Exit Capacity further ahead in time, in overall quantities that are far greater than they are likely to need, is not beneficial for system operation and is not likely to be cost efficient. Users who know they are likely to have over-bought Exit Capacity for their customers also know that they will pay a higher proportion of total transmission costs and will aim to recover those costs during that year. Other Users are not likely to be able to benefit from conversely paying a lower proportion during the same year because National Gas are unlikely to be able to accurately estimate over-buying in their Forecasted Contracted Capacity calculation in order to reduce Reserve Prices.

# 4 Code Specific Matters

## **Reference Documents**

Transmission Workgroup minutes from 01 June 2023 (see section 1.3)

National Gas Exit Constraints Webinar 16 December 2022 Q&A document

National Emergency Plan for downstream gas and electricity

**UNC TPD Section J - Exit Requirements** 

**UNC TPD Section Q - Emergencies** 

## 5 Solution

#### Proposed business rules:

- 1. The role of NTS Registered Capacity holdings are as a financial hedge against overrun charges, and they should not impact the operational NTS offtake rights of the holder.
- 2. There are circumstances where a User is entitled to offtake gas from the system at a rate that exceeds

  1/24<sup>th</sup> of their daily capacity holdings i.e. the maximum permitted rate in UNC TPD Section J should

  not be in any way limited by a User's NTS Exit Capacity holding
- 3. The Permitted Offtake Rate for an Offtake Profile Notice (OPN) for any NTS Exit Point shall not be restricted or impacted by a User's NTS Exit Capacity holding.
- 4. An OPN should contain a user's best estimate of their expected offtake.
- 5. For the avoidance of doubt, the reduction or discontinuance of the offtake of gas at Exit Points may only be instructed in accordance with the provisions of UNC TPD Section Q Emergencies

#### It is proposed that:

- relevant sections of the text in Section J, which state Transporters are not obligated to make gas
  available if a User does not hold Registered Exit Capacity, are removed. Calculations of compensation
  due to Users if Transporters do not make gas available remain unchanged
- text be added to TPD Section J to clarify that a site that submits an OPN would not have this rejected for the reason of not holding the corresponding Exit Capacity.
- text be added to TPD Section Q Emergencies to clarify that the reduction or discontinuance of offtake
  of gas at Exit Points may only be instructed in accordance with the provisions of that section of the UNC,
  and for the avoidance of doubt, is unaffected by whether a User holds Exit Capacity or not.

# 6 Impacts & Other Considerations

Does this Modification impact a Significant Code Review (SCR) or other significant industry change projects, if so, how?

No

# Joint Office of Gas Transporters

## **Consumer Impacts**

Reduced over-buying of Exit Capacity, and hence a more even distribution of transmission costs according to use of the system and reduction of over-recovery in revenues, is likely to lead to reduced prices and hence reduced costs to large consumers.

# What is the current consumer experience and what would the new consumer experience be?

No impact

Impact of the change on Consumer Benefit Areas:		
Area	Identified impact	
Improved safety and reliability  No change to system operation and management	None	
Lower bills than would otherwise be the case  This Modification is most likely to impact Exit Capacity procurement strategies of Shippers for Very Large Consumers such as CCGTs or large industrials, who may as a result reduce their over-buying of Exit Capacity and in turn reduce the costs of their products to their customers.	Positive	
Reduced environmental damage  None	None	
Improved quality of service None	None	
Benefits for society as a whole  None	None	

# **Cross-Code Impacts**

None

**EU Code Impacts** 

None

**Central Systems Impacts** 

None

# 7 Relevant Objectives

impact of the Modification on the Transporters' Relevant Objectives:	
Relevant Objective	Identified impact
a) Efficient and economic operation of the pipe-line system.	None
<ul><li>b) Coordinated, efficient and economic operation of</li><li>(i) the combined pipe-line system, and/ or</li><li>(ii) the pipe-line system of one or more other relevant gas transporters.</li></ul>	None
c) Efficient discharge of the licensee's obligations.	None
<ul> <li>d) Securing of effective competition: <ul> <li>(i) between relevant shippers;</li> <li>(ii) between relevant suppliers; and/or</li> <li>(iii) between DN operators (who have entered into transportation arrangements with other relevant gas transporters) and relevant shippers.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Positive
e) Provision of reasonable economic incentives for relevant suppliers to secure	None

that the domestic customer supply security standards... are satisfied as

f) Promotion of efficiency in the implementation and administration of the Code.

g) Compliance with the Regulation and any relevant legally binding decisions of

the European Commission and/or the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy

respects the availability of gas to their domestic customers.

# 8 Implementation

Regulators.

As Self-Governance procedures are proposed, implementation could be sixteen business days after a Modification Panel decision to implement, subject to no Appeal being raised.

None

None

# 9 Legal Text

Legal text will be drawn up by the relevant Transporter at a time when the Modification is sufficiently developed.

## 10 Recommendations

## **Proposer's Recommendation to Panel**

Panel is asked to:

Refer this proposal to a Workgroup for assessment.